The younger American right isn’t like the conservatism of 20 years ago – it’s more reactionary, more pessimistic and possibly more dangerous. That’s the message of a pair of recent anthropologies of the youthful conservative intelligentsia: one by Sam Adler-Bell in The New Republic, based on interviews with various junior reactionaries, and one by my colleague David Brooks in The Atlantic, following his sojourn at the National Conservatism Conference in Orlando, Fla.
The essays emphasize the ways in which the newer, younger right is ill at ease in contemporary America, its psychology defined more by alienation than the basic patriotic comfort.
This emphasis is understandable, but there’s another way of looking at the new right’s place in American politics. Its vibe is alienated and radical, certainly – but at the same time its analysis of our situation feels more timely, more of this moment, than many alternative programs on the right or left or center.
Suppose you made a list of what each tendency in American politics considers our biggest challenges right now. For the new right, the list might look something like this.
Abroad, the double failure of our post-9/11 nation-building efforts and our open door to China, which requires either a recalibration to contain the Chinese regime or else a general pullback from an overextended empire.
At home, the threat to liberty from Silicon Valley monopolies enforcing progressive orthodoxy and the threat to human happiness from the addictive nature of social media, online pornography and online life in general. The collapse of birthrates, the dissolution of institutional religion and the decline of bourgeois normalcy, manifest in the younger generation’s failure to mate, to marry and raise families. The costs of cultural libertarianism, the increase in unhappiness and high rates of depression and addiction in a more individualistic society.
Then finally, the way in which the technocratic response to the pandemic, the retreat to a virtual life suited only to a “laptop class” may make these problems worse.
Now, you can critique this list and doubt its diagnoses. But still, if you look at reality through the new right’s alienated vision, you may see the strange world of 2021 more clearly than through other eyes. It responds to 21st century developments (the China shock, the post-9/11 wars), to trends that have accelerated (religious disaffiliation, the birth dearth) or become more apparent (the great stagnation) since the turn of the millennium.
I don’t see the same timeliness among the new right’s rivals.
Meanwhile, both left and center-left are of the moment in their anxiety about Donald Trump. But if you ask them what they really want to do, what problems they intend to fix, their answers usually involve projects that date to the 1960s and 1970s: the completion of a Scandinavian-style welfare state for the economic left, the deconstruction of white male Christian heteronormativity for woke progressivism.
If you asked which worldview has organized itself primarily around things that have changed in the world since 1999, I don’t think you’d pick progressivism. When the Biden administration is criticized from the left for its poverty of vision, the missing vision still sounds mostly like a Hubert Humphrey restoration.
Being timelier, of course, doesn’t mean that the younger right is destined for power or wise governance. Its prescriptions lag its diagnoses and may never win popular support.
But still, if you look at reality through the new right’s alienated vision, you may see the strange world of 2021 more clearly than through other eyes.
The New York Times