As the Aug. 31 deadline for withdrawal of American combat troops from Iraq draws near, the gulf continues to widen between the goal that was supposed to have been achieved by the end of the month, and the contradictory reality.
When the deadline was fixed nearly two years ago by agreement of Iraqi government and the prior Bush administration, American commanders and administration officials anticipated – or said they did – that Iraq would be under a popularly elected and secure government by the end of this month. The new parliamentary government, both sides pretended to assume, would be able to manage the burdens and hopes of a fundamentally reformed state and calm its fractious sectarian and ethnic groups.
The reality, predictably, is far more disheartening. National elections more than five months ago produced a narrow victory for the party led partly by the minority Sunni sect, yet the hold-over Shiite-dominated government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki refuses to relinquish its turf. This week, tedious negotiations for a political compromise broke down completely.
Discouraged by the continuing political stalemate, rampant corruption, sectarian strife, 60 percent unemployment and a miserably dysfunctional absence of reliable electricity, clean water, sanitation and civil services, most Iraqis wonder when, if ever, its squabbling political leaders will help their nation stand up and become reasonably orderly, safe and prosperous.
Indeed, amid the political chaos, public fear, nagging insurgency and social disorder, the surer bet seems to be that Iraq will ultimately divide into the sectarian strife and that critics have feared from the beginning of America’s Iraq war. The equally feared denouement is that further conflict may again produce (or require, as some Iraqis see it) another tyrant strongman atop the country on par with those in virtually every other authoritarian state in the Arab League’s 22 member-bloc.
It is true, of course, that the American military is not scheduled for complete withdrawal until 2012. Until then, a residual garrison force of some 50,000 U.S. troops will remain to provide training for Iraqi military and police forces, to hunt al-Qaida and other extremists and terrorists, and to be available for support of the government, even as U.S. soldiers continue to dismantle and withdraw their military infrastructure.
The sad facts of the state of Iraq’s dysfunctional government are already coming to be seen as much as a judgment and commentary on the costly and deadly American experiment in Iraq, as a commentary on the Iraqi government and its people.
Skeptics contend today’s reality in Iraq suggests a failure of the American effort in Iraq. Among Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East, the broader question is how Iraq’s plight, after seven years of an American war and occupation, reflects on a fickle America’s staying power vis-a-vis a long-view of the Middle East.
Many in the Middle East now see America as impatient to a fault with respect to the decision to leave Iraq before stability is achieved. In that view, Washington throws its weighty power around, expects and sets deadlines for big results, and then gets bored, hurt, tired and ready to quit before the fruit of its efforts can be reasonably nurtured to completion.
Americans likely see less of a cut-and-run surrender than an admission of reality: Ultimately, America cannot cure ancient animosities among Iraqis and impose cohesiveness where there is none naturally.
The resolution of this debate is not yet set in stone. Iraq’s sectarian forces yet could learn to come together for the good of their country. Or they just keep their powder dry until Americans finally leave for good and let them settle their ancient feuds and ambitions for primacy on their own.
The salient fact – and the lesson still to be learned – is as clear now as it was before the Bush administration recklessly rushed into this needless war: It was mistaken arrogance to ever believe that Washington could impose its will on an ancient, alien and deeply rooted culture of 25 million people from afar, and on the cheap. The supreme valor and dedication of American troops notwithstanding, the scars, deaths, blood and mistakes of the occupation, and the wounds that attend the exit, are ample evidence of that.