Kyrgyzstan, a mountainous, landlocked country in Central Asia, plays a key if little-known role in the U.S. war in Afghanistan. The former Soviet republic is home to an immense U.S. military base that is a vital supply hub in the fight against the Taliban in nearby Afghanistan. The future of that base, however, is uncertain following what appears to be a successful revolution against the government of President Kurmanbek Bakiyev.
Reports Wednesday from Bishkek, the nation’s capital, indicated that opposition leaders had seized control of the country and that Mr. Bakiyev had fled the capital. It is, at this writing, difficult to verify with certainty who is in control of Kyrgyzstan and what the domestic and foreign policy of the new leaders might be. One oft-stated goal of those who sought Mr. Bakiyev’s ouster, however, should deeply concern the United States.
Opponents consistently have called for the closure of the U.S. air base near the capital of Bishkek. There appeared to be no imminent move by protesters or their leadership to take any direct or indirect action against the base. The U.S. State Department reported late Wednesday, in fact, that the base was “functioning normally.”
The White House and U.S. military leaders can only hope that continues to be the case. Any change in the operational status of the base — leased to the United States through an agreement negotiated last year with Mr. Bakiyev — surely would have a profoundly negative impact on the movement of materiel integral to the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. That’s especially true since a similar base in nearby Uzbekistan, which once would have provided a useful redundancy in the supply chain, was closed not long ago.
If, indeed, a new Kyrgyz government emerges it likely will be less accommodating to the United States than its predecessor. The Obama administration actively cultivated ties with Mr. Bakiyev after he threatened to close the U.S. base. He changed his mind after the United States agreed to new rules, including significantly higher rental fees. Those opposed to Mr. Bakiyev and his policies viewed the U.S. willingness to negotiate with him as tacit approval of all his policies.
Perhaps, the need for a base to supply troops engaged in combat prompted U.S. officials to overlook some of the seamier aspects of Mr. Bakiyev’s presidency. If that was the case, the United States should have worked harder to make plain that its need for the base did not signal support for the man and all his policies.
The Kyrgyz leader took office in 2005 on a wave of support engendered by his promise to provide stability. It was a pledge he could not keep. Recently, opponents say, the country became less democratic and more abusive of human rights. Charges of corruption and cronyism dogged the government, too. The protests appear to be a natural outgrowth of the discontent those changes wrought.
Mr. Bakiyev’s government seems to be the immediate casualty of the Kyrgyz upheaval. Collateral damage to the U.S. war effort in Afghanistan will take longer to become evident. The chance that it could become fact should unnerve the White House and U.S. military leaders.